Why the classified document scandal matters
Most importantly, the statement, “There’s no there, there” displays a dismissiveness toward the citizenry (or maggotry, as I believe we’re considered) that is appalling at best. We simply don’t count; there’s a separate justice system for the well-off and the well-connected.
Second, several broadcasts have shown President Biden holding a document cover (with or without a corresponding document) reading CODEWORD. The documents found in various places have been classified TS/SCI, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. This will get quite confusing, but CODEWORD documents are potentially far more dangerous to US National Security than TS/SCI. Take some no-doze, and maybe a gallon of coffee. This is about to get tedious.
Most importantly, the statement, “There’s no there, there” displays a dismissiveness toward the citizenry (or maggotry, as I believe we’re considered) that is appalling at best. We simply don’t count; there’s a separate justice system for the well-off and the well-connected.
Second, several broadcasts have shown President Biden holding a document cover (with or without a corresponding document) reading CODEWORD. The documents found in various places have been classified TS/SCI, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. This will get quite confusing, but CODEWORD documents are potentially far more dangerous to US National Security than TS/SCI. Take some no-doze, and maybe a gallon of coffee. This is about to get tedious.
TS/SCI is about what we, the US, have collected on other countries. This may not make much sense – if we’ve collected the information about them, then they already know it. What they don’t know is that we know it. SCI comes in two flavors, both technical. If an enemy learns that we have technically penetrated his operations, then he simply changes the technical protection that we’ve compromised. This leaves us blind if we’re lucky. If we’re unlucky, it leaves us vulnerable to misinformation. The issue becomes critical if nuclear weapons are involved and mixed with misinformation.
Back to why President Biden’s classified documents scandal matters. It is almost impossible for anyone not sleep walking to inadvertently walk out of a SCIF with classified documents. There are signs prominently displayed on the outside of the SCIF with warnings about entry. In many cases there is an armed guard at the door. The briefing one receives when authorized to view the material mentions that the armed guard has orders to shoot to kill to prevent unauthorized exposure of the material inside. That certainly got my attention. The guard is still there on one’s way out.
No one is ever allowed inside a SCIF alone. Someone else was with you when you absconded with the TS/SCI documents. If somehow you managed entry to the SCIF on your own, you knew you were violating the rules, which carry criminal penalties. I can recall many evenings staying late while a co-worker slaved away on something I had no need to know about, but I was required to remain watching him nonetheless. Other nights I was the one working and a colleague had to stay late. None of us minded particularly, since we knew it was part of the price of entry to a world of secrets.
TS/SCI is about what we, the US, have collected on other countries. This may not make much sense – if we’ve collected the information about them, then they already know it. What they don’t know is that we know it. SCI comes in two flavors, both technical. If an enemy learns that we have technically penetrated his operations, then he simply changes the technical protection that we’ve compromised. This leaves us blind if we’re lucky. If we’re unlucky, it leaves us vulnerable to misinformation. The issue becomes critical if nuclear weapons are involved and mixed with misinformation.
Most TS/SCI documents I have seen are also CODEWORD documents. Codewords are used to hide the most sensitive information we hold; not all Codeword documents are about intelligence we have collected. Some – perhaps the most sensitive documents – are about our own plans and operations. They can be applied to actual operations and plans, or to contingency operations and plans. For example, if we have discovered a new use for byzulium tetrascudate, and plan to gain control over the entire world’s supply of the stuff, we might assign a codeword – let’s say Rumplestiltskin – to our plan to monopolize the world’s supply of byzulium tetrascudate. Details could be classified at any level, depending on how damaging the information might be if it was compromised. So, a list of attendees at a logistics conference about byzulium tetrascudate might be classified SECRET/RUMPLESTILTSKIN.
The first trove of documents was found in the Penn/Biden Center, which was funded by China. It seems that the economy has gotten so bad that our President had to take on a second job, teaching at the Penn/Biden Center where he was paid slightly less than $1M per year. From funds supplied by unidentified people in China. It was never necessary to comb through “the laptop from hell” searching for financial connections between Joe Biden and China. They’ve been hidden in plain sight for years.
It's been many years since I’ve been in a SCIF. I don’t mind; I already know too many secrets. I have had to take Sensitive Compartmented Information with me when leaving a SCIF and did so in a locked briefcase with two separate locks. I was quite happy to surrender the material at the location I was visiting.
It's been many years since I’ve been in a SCIF. I don’t mind; I already know too many secrets. I have had to take Sensitive Compartmented Information with me when leaving a SCIF and did so in a locked briefcase with two separate locks. I was quite happy to surrender the material at the location I was visiting.
Oops
Full Disclosure. About three months ago when sorting through boxes we hadn’t opened in more than thirty years we came upon a single page stamped CONFIDENTIAL. This was a case of peculiar circumstances. The document, which associated me with the actual unit to which I had been assigned, was classified only in Europe. I had needed a single copy of the document to satisfy audit trail requirements. My former unit was disestablished within five years of my departure, thus the document was no longer classified, although marked as such. I did what I consider to be the sensible thing and shredded the document.
Not sure what I think about the process of maintaining classification. I retired two computers that we had purchased used, and then used ourselves for about 5 years. We removed the hard drives, as is our practice to protect sensitive client data, only to find that they had stickers that read SECRET. BMDS-SCG. Declassify on (date). I don't recall anything on the computers when we purchased them except the operating system, so the disks had probably been wiped. One would think that a sensitive operation like the nation's ballistic missile defense system would have prohibited the re-use of hard drives, but what do I know.
I LOVE byzulium tetrascudate. I had some last night with some fried plantains and egg shells.